UC Irvine Law Review
Volume 9 | Issue 4

Article 6

5-2019

CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS: HOW THIRTEEN
DAYS CHANGED THE WORLD
Edward A. Danielyan

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.uci.edu/ucilr
Part of the Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons
Recommended Citation
Edward A. Danielyan, CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS: HOW THIRTEEN DAYS CHANGED THE WORLD, 9 U.C. Irvine L. Rev. 989
(2019).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.uci.edu/ucilr/vol9/iss4/6

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by UCI Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in UC Irvine Law Review by
an authorized editor of UCI Law Scholarly Commons.

Final to Printer_Danielyan (Do Not Delete)

6/7/2019 6:35 PM

CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS:
HOW THIRTEEN DAYS CHANGED
THE WORLD
Edward A. Danielyan
Throughout her Negotiation and Mediation course at the
University of California, Irvine School of Law, Professor Carrie
Menkel-Meadow1 instructed her students to be prudent, diligent, creative
and cooperative negotiators. This note is based on an assignment from
Professor Menkel-Meadow’s course and is thus subject to inherent
limitations in its scope.
As a renowned national and international expert in alternative
dispute resolution (ADR), Professor Menkel-Meadow facilitated the
growth and frequency of use of ADR in the United States since the late
1970s and early 1980s,2 and has continued to develop this field of study
to present day.3
This note focuses on three concepts that make a negotiator effective:
(1) necessity of strategic and thorough preparation before negotiations;
(2) use of framing and establishment of reputation during negotiations;
and (3) flexibility in resorting to facilitated mediation. My analysis of
these concepts is discussed through the thirteen days of negotiations
Edward Aleksandrovich Danielyan is a Juris Doctor candidate at the University of California, Irvine
School of Law.
1. Professor Menkel-Meadow is a founder of the dispute resolution field. Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
UCI LAW, https://www.law.uci.edu/faculty/full-time/menkel-meadow/ [https://perma.cc/845B828Y] (last visited Apr. 5, 2019). In addition to a plethora of other awards, the first-ever Award for
Outstanding Scholarly Work, presented by the American Bar Association’s Dispute Resolution section,
was presented to Professor Menkel-Meadow, who was lauded as a “tireless, prolific and influential
researcher and writer” who put forth the transformative idea of “lawyer as problem solver” twenty-five
years ago. Id. Published in dozens of books and articles, Professor Menkel-Meadow has
also taught at some of the most prestigious legal institutions in the United States and worldwide.
See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Curriculum Vitae, https://www.law.uci.edu/faculty/full-time/menkelmeadow/menkelmeadowCV.pdf [ https://perma.cc/X3PZ-BHWE ] ( last visited Apr. 5, 2019 ).
2. See generally Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Regulation of Dispute Resolution in the United States of
America: From the Formal to the Informal to the ‘Semi-formal’, in REGULATING DISPUTE
RESOLUTION: ADR AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE AT THE CROSSROADS 419 (Felix Steffek et al. eds., 2013).
3. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 1.
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between President John F. Kennedy (JFK) and Soviet Premier Nikita
S. Khrushchev (Khrushchev) during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.
This paper is divided into two major components. First, I will analyze
the United States’ initial contemplation in response to evidence of the
Soviet Union’s construction of offensive-weapon bases in Cuba. Then, I
will analyze the correspondences between JFK and Khrushchev leading
up to the United Nations-based mediation sessions.
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ 990
INITIAL CONTEMPLATION .................................................................................. 991
Prepare Well for Negotiations ......................................................................... 991
Strike: Factual Background ...................................................................... 991
Strike: Analysis ........................................................................................... 992
Blockade/Quarantine: Factual Background ......................................... 994
Blockade/Quarantine: Analysis .............................................................. 995
COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN JFK AND KHRUSHCHEV ..................... 997
Frame Your Position, but Remain Open to Mediation. .............................. 997
Announcement/Quarantine .................................................................... 997
Post-Quarantine......................................................................................... 998
Negotiation and Mediation ....................................................................1000
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................ 1001

INTRODUCTION
It is important to recognize the existence of dozens of considerations and
factors leading up to the October 1962 negotiations between JFK and Khrushchev.
Due to the nature of this paper, I am unable to provide an exhaustive synopsis of
every relevant consideration affecting both parties during this international conflict.
Furthermore, this Note takes a somewhat oversimplified approach to the multilateral aspect of international negotiations; I excluded mention of JFK’s and
Khrushchev’s advisors (such as Robert Kennedy), foreign ministers, military
commanders, and other relevant parties directly involved in the behind-the-scenes
strategy making processes.
Although there is a voluminous amount of sources available regarding the
Cuban Missile Crisis, the inherently complex nature of international disputes—
e.g. the effects on the global perception of a state’s foreign policy, image, and
strength—are also largely omitted from this Note. As such, this Note’s narrow
scope is geared towards the procedural, tactical, and analytical elements of the
thirteen days of negotiations between JFK and Khrushchev. The main sources
guiding my discussion are: The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962;4 Reflections on the Cuban

4.

THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS, 1962 (Laurence Chang & Peter Kornbluh eds., 1992).

Final to Printer_Danielyan (Do Not Delete)

2019]

CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

6/7/2019 6:35 PM

991

Missile Crisis;5 Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962;6 The Great Negotiations;7 Negotiation:
Processes for Problem Solving;8 Getting to Yes;9 and Art of the Deal.10
INITIAL CONTEMPLATION
Prepare Well for Negotiations
On October 16, 1962, JFK along with the National Security Advisor
McGeorge Bundy and other top advisors (collectively, The Executive Committee
of the National Security Council (ExComm)), received images of Soviet mediumrange ballistic missile bases under construction in Cuba.11 ExComm faced a difficult
decision of how to respond to the Soviet Union’s actions. Although ExComm and
JFK contemplated various options, my analysis focuses on two possible responses
to the pending threat emanating ninety miles from U.S. soil: (1) eliminating the bases
through air and ground strikes; or (2) instituting a blockade on Soviet ships carrying
weapons to Cuba.12
The deliberations between JFK and ExComm in choosing an adequate
response to Soviet actions in Cuba best resemble conducting substantive legal
research prior to a negotiation. Specifically, preparing for a negotiation by carefully
analyzing the parameters of the issue allows a party to approach conflict resolution
in an effective and anticipatory manner, likely yielding better results.
Strike: Factual Background
ExComm unanimously recognized the need to eliminate the Soviet missile
bases from Cuba, because the bases posed a high risk to the U.S. national security.13
JFK and his advisors initially approached accomplishing this need by contemplating
an air strike because: (1) it would include the element of surprise since the Soviet
Union was not aware of the United States’ knowledge of the bases; (2) there was a
sense of urgency to act because the bases were not yet operational; and (3) the air
strike would quickly alleviate the immediate Soviet threat in Cuba.14 Additionally,
conducting an air strike would illustrate the strength of the United States in the
5.
6.

RAYMOND L. GARTHOFF, REFLECTIONS ON THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS (2d ed. 1989).
TIM COATES, THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS, 1962: SELECTED FOREIGN POLICY
DOCUMENTS FROM THE ADMINISTRATION OF JOHN F. KENNEDY, JANUARY 1961–NOVEMBER 1962
(2002).
7. FREDRIK STANTON, GREAT NEGOTIATIONS: AGREEMENTS THAT CHANGED THE
MODERN WORLD (2011).
8. CARRIE MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., NEGOTIATION: PROCESSES FOR PROBLEM SOLVING
(2d ed. 2014).
9. ROGER FISHER ET AL., GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING
IN. (3d ed., 2011).
10. DONALD TRUMP, THE ART OF THE DEAL (1987).
11. THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS, 1962, supra note 4, at 77.
12. Id. at 78.
13. Id. at 79.
14. Id.
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international arena as a major superpower. Once the option of an air strike was on
the list of possible United States responses, ExComm began further deliberations,
engaging in a fuller analysis of the implications and consequences of military
action.15 Air Force officials stated the air strike would need to be massive against
Cuba rather than a surgical one, and at best, it would only eliminate 60-90 percent
of the missiles in Cuba.16 Furthermore, an air strike would: (1) potentially upset
U.S. allies because there would not be enough time to consult them; (2) bring about
a maximum communist reaction in Latin America;17 and (3) serve as irrevocable
action on United States’ behalf. Robert Kennedy (RFK) stated the air strike:
[W]ould represent a sneak attack on a small nation with all the memory of
Pearl Harbor . . . destroy[ing] the U.S.’s moral position and alienat[ing]
friends and allies. The whole post-war effort of trying to organize the
combined strength of the Free World would be in shards and tatters.18
Another one of JFK’s considerations was the lack of knowledge about the
Soviet Union’s perspective on these developments.19
Strike: Analysis
Although it is difficult to determine the full Zone of Possible Agreement
(ZOPA) guiding this situation, some oversimplified ZOPA options include:
U.S. inaction; U.S. use of military force; and any strategies falling in-between the
two options. The possible Worst Alternatives to a Negotiated Agreement
(WATNA) of an air strike include: responsive Soviet military actions in Berlin or
Turkey; loss of American allies around the world; rising support of communism in
Latin America; aggravation of relations between the Soviet Union and United States;
and ultimately, a nuclear war. Conversely, the Best Alternative to a Negotiated
Agreement (BATNA) to a U.S. air strike involved the Soviet Union to dismantle
their offensive weapons in Cuba after communications and negotiations.20
ExComm’s initial consideration to conduct an air strike on Cuba echoes
Donald Trump’s approach to resolving conflicts. Specifically, Trump suggests:
“The worst thing you can possibly do in a deal is seem desperate to make it. The
best thing you can do is deal from strength, and leverage is the biggest

15. Id. at 78–80.
16. STANTON, supra note 7, at 167.
17. THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS, 1962, supra note 4, at 99.
18. Id. at 122.
19. STANTON, supra note 7, at 171 (“[JFK] had recently read Barbara Tuchman’s book The Guns
of August, which cataloged the errors that led to the start of World War I, and the risk of catastrophe
from one side misinterpreting the other’s signals haunted him. [JFK stated:] ‘We were not going to
misjudge . . . or precipitously push our adversaries into a course of action that was not intended or
anticipated.’”).
20. For a more in-depth discussion about the effects of multi-party dispute resolution on
calculating the ZOPA, WATNA, and BATNA, see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Introduction & Coda, in
COMPLEX DISPUTE RESOLUTION: VOLUME II: MULTI-PARTY DISPUTE RESOLUTION, DEMOCRACY,
AND DECISION MAKING (Carrie Menkel-Meadow, ed. 2012).
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strength you can have . . . .”21 Furthermore, a Trumpian strategy to resolving
conflicts includes fighting back:
[F]ight back very hard. The risk is that you’ll make a bad situation worse . . .
but my experience is that if you’re fighting for something you believe in—
even if it means alienating some people along the way—things usually work
out for the best at the end.22
As such, Donald Trump would have likely encouraged and advocated for the
option of military intervention in the Soviet construction of offensive-weapon bases
in Cuba. He would have likely argued that the United States obtained leverage by
covertly discovering the Soviet Union’s activities and should have utilized this
leverage to “fight back” against the threat to its national security by conducting an
air strike on Cuba. Donald Trump’s approach likely would not have entailed major
considerations for the U.S. allies or for alienating Latin America. It would have likely
incited more conflict, possibly resulting in a third world war or even a nuclear war.
Certainly, Trump’s advice is contextually tied to the business and real estate realms
and may not be applicable here. Nevertheless, in Negotiation: Processes for Problem
Solving, Professor Menkel-Meadow would drastically disagree with such a powerhungry, isolationist negotiation mindset regardless of context.
At such an early stage of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the United States was truly
unaware of the Soviet Union’s actual motives, desires, and interests. The likelihood
of the United States learning these unknown variables about the Soviets after an air
strike would drastically decrease. Converse to Donald Trump’s approach to conflict
resolution, Deborah Tannen would likely discourage the air strike on Cuba because
“opposition does not lead to truth when an issue is not composed of two opposing
sides but is a crystal of many sides. Often the truth is in the complex middle, not
the oversimplified extremes.”23 Professor Menkel-Meadow would likely support
Deborah Tannen because “[b]inary, oppositional presentations of facts in dispute
are not the best way for us to learn the truth; polarized debate distorts the truth,
leaves out important information, simplifies complexity and often obfuscates rather
than clarifies.”24 Professor Menkel-Meadow’s lessons of negotiating through a
collaborative and creative approach to problem solving—involving innovation and
preservation of relationships—directly conflict with the decision of utilizing military
force in Cuba and with Donald Trump’s approach to conflict resolution.

21.
22.
23.

TRUMP, supra note 10, at 37.
Id. at 41.
MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., supra note 8, at 14 (quoting DEBORAH TANNEN, THE
ARGUMENT CULTURE: MOVING FROM DEBATE TO DIALOGUE 3–4, 8, 10 (1998)).
24. Id. (quoting Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System in a Postmodern,
Multicultural World, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 5, 6–10 (1996)). Andrea Kupfer Schneider’s article also
illustrates that an adversarial approach to conflict resolution is far less effective than
true problem solving, or even cautious problem solving approaches. Id. at 132 (quoting Andrea
Schneider, Shattering Negotiation Myths: Empirical Evidence on the Effectiveness of Negotiation Style, 7
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 143, 171-75 (2002)).
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Although ExComm balanced the United States’ national security with
potential detrimental consequences of an air strike, two additional factors greatly
weighed against its decision to use military force: (1) an “air strike was drastic and
irrevocable action”;25 and (2) the air strike would not resolve anything because the
Soviet Union could continue shipping weapons to Cuba. Professor MenkelMeadow’s in-class discussions best categorize the former consideration: “It is always
easier to escalate than it is to deescalate a situation.”26 Furthermore, an air strike
would not only aggravate the Soviet Union and Cuba, but it would also be an
extreme reaction to a situation with numerous unknown variables. Professor
Menkel-Meadow would likely discourage the air strike option also because it is not
wise to be “the hammer that hits every nail it sees . . . [instead], successful
negotiations require thorough analysis.”27 The Cuban situation “was too volatile for
such an escalation, and [JFK] wanted to give the Soviets a chance to back down
before taking irrevocable action.”28
In spite of Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon’s, Theodore Sorensen’s
(“Sorensen”), and CIA Special National Intelligence Estimate’s ardent support for
the air strike29, ExComm decided to forego any advantages of a surprise air strike.
Instead, ExComm elected to make a public statement, send nonencrypted
communications to U.S. military bases, and place a blockade (also referred to as
“quarantine”) on Soviet ships.
Blockade/Quarantine: Factual Background
Sorensen’s written report of ExComm’s available options, dated October 20,
1962, stated that the graduated strategy of implementing a blockade “is a more
prudent and flexible step which enables [the U.S.] to move to an air strike, invasion
or any other step at any time it proves necessary, without the ‘Pearl Harbor’ posture.”30
Sorensen also wrote that the blockade is “the step least likely to precipitate general
war while still causing the Soviets—unwilling to engage our Navy in our waters—
to back down and abandon Castro.”31 ExComm believed that although a blockade
would not automatically achieve the United States’ goal of eliminating Soviet
weapons from Cuba, it would “not begin with sudden death, and it was a first step,
not a last.”32 In his correspondence to JFK on October 17, 1962, the
U.N. Ambassador, stated that “talking with K[hrushchev] would afford a chance of

25. THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS, 1962, supra note 4, at 79.
26. Professor Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Negotiations Lecture at University of California, Irvine
School of Law
27. Id.
28. STANTON, supra note 7, at 168.
29. THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS, 1962, supra note 4, at 116–18, 128–32, 134–43.
30. Id. at 133 (emphasis added).
31. Id.
32. STANTON, supra note 7, at 168.
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uncovering his motives and objectives far better than correspondence thru the
‘usual channels.’”33
Some ExComm proponents of the air strike thought the blockade decision
was not a strong or adequate response to seemingly offensive Soviet actions. In
response to these concerns, ExComm’s decision to implement the blockade was
accompanied with a public announcement, indicating United States’ knowledge of
the Soviet developments in Cuba, and nonencrypted communications to U.S. bases
around the world. Upon JFK’s speech addressing the nation on October 22
(analyzed in the second part of this Note), nearly all “U.S. military forces worldwide
increased their alert status to Defense Condition (“DEFCON”) 3 . . . [and]
U.S. nuclear forces were placed on an even higher alert footing, DEFCON 2, only
one step away from DEFCON 1,” which meant war.34 These communications were
strategically sent as nonencrypted messages in order to ensure the “Soviet
intelligence would not mistake the seriousness of the U.S. military preparations to
wage nuclear war.”35 It is also important to mention that before informing
Khrushchev and the world of its decision, the United States informed the United
Nations of the Soviet missile developments in Cuba—an analysis of the United
Nations’ involvement is included in the Negotiation and Mediation Section below.
Blockade/Quarantine: Analysis
ExComm’s decision to place a blockade on Soviet ships carrying military
equipment to Cuba can best be categorized as an action to: (1) keep the parties at
the negotiation table; (2) decrease the likelihood of detrimental consequences; and
(3) afford the negotiation counterpart an opportunity to voice his demands and/or
concerns. This approach best mirrors the concepts from Professor MenkelMeadow’s course—specifically, concepts highlighting cooperative or collaborative
(over competitive) methods of negotiations. Professor Menkel-Meadow and
Kenneth Thomas believe:
There are those who compete (or seek to maximize their own self-interest,
even at the expense of others), those who cooperate (seeking to work with
the other side to find some middle or compromise grounds) . . . and those
who collaborate (by seeking to work for joint and mutual gains for all parties,
without unnecessary harm to others or needless compromise or giving
in).36
Whereas a U.S. air strike would be a classical decision to compete with the
Soviet Union, the U.S. decision to place a blockade on Soviet ships contains
elements of cooperative and collaborative schools of negotiation.
33. See THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS, 1962, supra note 4, at 119.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., supra note 8, at 9 (citing Kenneth Thomas, Conflict and Conflict
Management, in HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY (Marvin
V. Dunnette ed., 1976)) (emphasis in original).
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ExComm’s blockade decision also accomplished several negotiation tactics
articulated by Roger Fisher and William Ury.37 Specifically, the United States utilized
a problem-solving mindset, which allowed it to ask questions, test assumptions, and
maintain relationships—not only with the Soviet Union but also with U.S. allies. By
not “striking first and asking questions after,” ExComm created an opportunity to
bargain over positions as opposed to interests (analyzed further below in my analysis
of the communications between JFK and Khrushchev). ExComm analytically
created a strategic and open first step towards negotiating the elimination of
offensive-weapon bases in Cuba. Professor Menkel-Meadow suggests that
“unearthing a greater number of the actual needs of the parties will create more
possible solutions because not all needs will be mutually exclusive.”38 In light of the
many unknown variables guiding the Soviet Union’s intentions, accomplishing the
“unearthing [of] a greater number of the actual needs” would have been difficult
with an immediate air strike on Cuba.39 As such, ExComm’s blockade decision
allowed the United States to invent an option for possible future mutual gain.40 This
would allow ExComm to learn the Soviet Union’s needs, demands, deal points, and
deal killers in future negotiations while preventing the alienation of U.S. allies and
maintaining the American moral character. Additionally, the blockade option would
allow the parties to keep talking—one of Roger Fisher’s tools in negotiations.41
Professor Menkel-Meadow also believes better solutions to conflict are those
with minimal transaction costs.42 The U.S. decision to place a blockade on Soviet
ships, increase DEFCOM levels, and make a public announcement had fewer
transaction costs than the air strike option. Implementing a blockade served as a
statement of the United States’ dissatisfaction with Soviet actions, while sending
nonencrypted communications—increasing DEFCOM levels throughout
U.S. military bases—further strengthened the United States’ position. In fact, Peter
T. Coleman and Saul Alinsky would likely support the tactical maneuver of
increasing DEFCOM levels through nonencrypted communications because they
believe that the perception of power matters in a negotiation.43 Saul Alinsky writes:
“Power is not only what you have but what the enemy thinks you have . . . .”44
Regardless of the United States’ desire to engage in an all-out war, these
communications served as a crafty method of conveying the United States’ readiness
and willingness to stand by its position.

37. See generally FISHER ET AL., supra note 9.
38. MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., supra note 8, at 125 (quoting Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward
Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754, 795 (1984)).
39. Id.
40. See generally FISHER ET AL., supra note 9.
41. Id.
42. See MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., supra note 8, at 127 (quoting Menkel-Meadow, Toward
Another View of Legal Negotiation, supra note 36).
43. Id. at 266.
44. Id.
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Thus, the United States engaged in a thorough analysis of the situation by
analyzing its options, viable Soviet responses to each option, and, most importantly,
the likelihood of the United States achieving its goals through each course of action.
This degree of negotiation preparation placed the United States in a position to
better understand Khrushchev’s desires while retaining control of the further
negotiations.
COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN JFK AND KHRUSHCHEV
Frame Your Position, but Remain Open to Mediation.
This part of the paper focuses on JFK’s and Khrushchev’s negotiations tactics
through their written communications to one another, and the importance of
mediation.
Announcement/Quarantine
On October 22, 1962, JFK wrote a letter to Khrushchev and made a televised
announcement to the United States, officially implementing the blockade through
Congressional acquiescence.45 The letter briefly mentioned previous discussions
between JFK and Khrushchev in Vienna and outlined the position of the United
States. JFK’s televised announcement to the nation not only solidified the topics of
his correspondence to Khrushchev in greater detail but also strategically increased
transparency of the situation by informing the world about Soviet actions in Cuba.
JFK’s decision to make this announcement resembles Professor Menkel-Meadow’s
former University of California Los Angeles Law student’s decision to waive
confidentiality in a settlement, foregoing a higher settlement amount, merely to shed
light on a specific issue. This way, if the Soviet Union preemptively conducted a
military strike on mainland United States, JFK would have had the United
States’ position and events leading up to the attack on record for the world to know.
Douglas Stone believes that the “primary task [in difficult conversations] is
not to persuade, impress, trick, outwit, convert, or win over the other person. It is
to express what you see and why you see it that way, how you feel, and maybe who
you are.”46 As such, JFK’s announcement indicated that the United States saw
recent Soviet activity in Cuba directly conflict with previous Soviet promises that
the “military equipment sent to Cuba [be] designed exclusively for defensive
purposes.”47 These inconsistencies made the United States feel deceived, forcing
JFK to announce, “The United States of America nor the world community of
nations can tolerate deliberate deception and offensive threats on the part of any

45.
46.

See THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS, 1962, supra note 4, at 148–54.
DOUGLAS STONE ET AL., DIFFICULT CONVERSATIONS: HOW TO DISCUSS WHAT
MATTERS MOST 185 (1999).
47. See THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS, 1962, supra note 4, at 150–54.

Final to Printer_Danielyan (Do Not Delete)

998

6/7/2019 6:35 PM

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 9:989

nation . . . .”48 Furthermore, JFK painted an image of who the United States was by
concluding his announcement with mention to the “character and courage” of the
nation, “vindication of right” instead of “victory in might,” and never choosing the
path of “surrender or submission.”49
Post-Quarantine
The next four communications between JFK and Khrushchev illustrate each
leader’s attempts to persuade the other leader of his position while preserving his
reputation.50
October 23
Khrushchev’s response to JFK’s televised announcement claimed the United
States’ blockade on Soviet ships was a “serious threat to peace and to the security
of nations[,] . . . violat[ing] the United Nations Charter and international norms.”51
Khrushchev stood his ground, claiming that the Soviet missiles in Cuba were
“intended solely for defensive purposes.”52
Professor Menkel-Meadow believes that in addition to substantively preparing
for negotiations, good negotiators could also “base [their] argument on good policy,
a principle to be upheld, or general custom in that type of business,” setting
seemingly objective criteria for the negotiation.53 Additional methods of bolstering
an argument include framing and analogy.54 In fact, psychologists, management
consultants, and communications experts agree that “framing” establishes “a stable
coherent cognitive structure that organizes and simplifies [complex realities].”55
Here, Khrushchev framed himself as a helping ally, contextually providing Cuba
with defensive weapons following the Bay of Pigs invasion. He further appealed to
general international customs and principles of the United Nations in an attempt to
suggest the United States was the aggressor, and that the blockade should be lifted.
In fact, framing the weapons in Cuba as either offensive or defensive was a crucial,
foundational argument in each leader’s communications. By framing the weapons
as offensive, JFK illustrated the need for mitigating measures in light of
Khrushchev’s earlier promises not to supply offensive weapons to Cuba.
Conversely, Khrushchev’s framing of the weapons as defensive allowed him to
argue a lack of wrongful actions by the Soviet Union.
JFK framed most of his correspondences by adhering to reason in attempts
to mitigate the severity of the situation while “cheerleading” for a non-violent
resolution to the crisis. JFK’s same-day response to Khrushchev’s letter illustrated

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id.
Id.
See THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS, 1962, supra note 4, at 156, 161–64, 173.
Id. at 156.
Id.
MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., supra note 8, at 108.
Id.
Id. at 109.
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his concern that the leaders “show prudence and do nothing to allow events to make
the situation more difficult to control than it already [was].”56
October 24 and October 25
In a responsive October 24 correspondence, Khrushchev claimed JFK was
“not declaring a quarantine, but rather [was] setting forth an ultimatum and
threatening that if [the Soviet Union does] not give in to [JFK’s] demands, [the
United States would] use force.”57 Khrushchev then pled for empathy and reason
by asking what the United States would do if such an “ultimatum” was presented
to it, implying that the Soviet response was perfectly rational. “Consider what you
are saying!” Khrushchev wrote, “And you want to persuade me to agree to this!”58
He attacked JFK’s use of reason, claiming the United States was the unreasonable
and irrational party. Lastly, Khrushchev framed his position through an appeal to
general principles as his main source of authority: “International law exists and
universally recognized norms of conduct exist. We firmly adhere to the principles
of international law and observe strictly the norms which regulate navigation on the
high seas, in international waters.”59
In addition to framing his position, Khrushchev also utilized his reputation
in his correspondence. Professor Menkel-Meadow believes that reputation is
important when negotiating, or expecting to negotiate again, with the same
counterparts or adversaries.60 In support of this notion, Catherine Tinsley further
notes that in a negotiation context “a player’s reputation is embodied in the beliefs
of others about the strategy that the player will use . . . . Thus, game theorists tend
to define a person’s reputation as another’s expectation of how that person will
behave.”61 Tangentially, although Daniel L. Shapiro suggests “emotions can hinder
the ability of negotiators to reach a wise agreement,” using emotions could possibly
affect the other party’s expectation of how the emotional negotiator will behave in
the future.62
In his October 24 correspondence, Khrushchev adhered to his reputation of
being a strict, abrasive, emotional and possibly erratic leader. Previously, in 1956, at
a Polish Embassy in Moscow, Khrushchev told the Western ambassadors, “We will
bury you!”63 In 1960, at a Plenary Meeting of the United Nations General Assembly,
Khrushchev notoriously took off his shoe and pounded it on the desk in protest at

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

See THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS, 1962, supra note 4, at 161–62.
Id. at 163–64.
Id.
Id.
MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., supra note 8, at 254.
Id. at 255 (quoting Catherine H. Tinsley et al., Reputations in Negotiation, in THE
NEGOTIATOR’S FIELDBOOK 203, 204 (Andrea K. Schneider & Christopher Honeyman eds., 2006)).
62. Daniel L. Shapiro, Emotions in Negotiation: Peril or Promise?, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 737, 738
(2004).
63. KHRUSHCHEV’S “WE W ILL BURY YOU,” https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/
docs/CIA-RDP73B00296R000200040087-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/796U-CCTX] (last visited May
21, 2019).
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a speech by a Philippine delegate. Khrushchev’s reputation for being emotional,
illustrated in his use of exclamation marks in his correspondences to JFK,
strategically created an air of mystery and unpredictability about the Soviet mentality
and actions. Juxtaposed with JFK’s calm and collected correspondences and
demeanor, Khrushchev’s erratic leadership persona could partially explain why
JFK’s calculations with ExComm regarding the United States’ response had to be
carefully deliberated.
In his October 25 responsive correspondence, JFK continued to portray the
United States’ position as one of reasonable necessity. He reiterated his perception
of the crisis while hoping that the two superpowers would “take necessary action to
permit a restoration of the earlier situation.”64 Utilizing his reputation for using
reason in these negotiations, JFK successfully conveyed a strong Western front
without aggravating the situation or provoking the Soviet Union in any way.
Negotiation and Mediation
The next five October communications between JFK and Khrushchev
focused on outlining each leader’s desired outcomes, finding common ground in
seeking peaceful relations, and most importantly, agreeing to send representatives
to mediation sessions with the United Nations.65 In these communications,
Khrushchev initiated the first official offer by proposing to remove the weapons
from Cuba and make a pledge to the United Nations to do so in return for United
States’ removal of similar weapons from Turkey and making a promise not to attack
Cuba. Khrushchev wrote that U Thant, the Acting Secretary General of the United
Nations, “to some degree has assumed the role of a mediator” and that the Soviet
Union “consider[s] that he will be able to cope with this responsible mission,
provided, of course, that each party drawn into this controversy displays good
will.”66
Professor Menkel-Meadow believes mediation is a wholesome and efficient
conflict-resolution mechanism. Specifically, mediation is inclined to: improve
participation and self-determination (each party retaining control over the process
and the outcome); result in a better outcome while generating creative problem
solving (including forward-looking strategies in developing options and optimal
outcomes); and foster relationships and build bridges between parties.67 Leonard
Riskin68 further distinguished the different types of mediators: e.g. the facilitative
mediator is one who “assumes the parties are intelligent, able to work with their
counterparts, and capable of understanding their situations better than . . . the

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
resolution.

See THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS, 1962, supra note 4, at 173.
Id. at 185–88, 197–99, 223–25, 226–32.
Id. at 197–99.
MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., supra note 8, at 544–47.
Leonard Riskin is a scholar in the field of negotiation, mediation, and alternative dispute
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mediator.”69 Furthermore, a facilitative meditator assumes that his “principal
mission is to enhance and clarify communications between the parties in order to
help them decide what to do.”70
Throughout the mediation process, U Thant facilitated this dispute resolution
by “sen[ding] appeals and messages, relay[ing] proposals, offer[ing] reassurances,
advanc[ing] the ‘non-invasion for missiles’ formula that formed the basis of the final
agreement, shuttl[ing] to Cuba to mollify Castro, and help[ing] secure a verification
agreement.”71 Reconciling the United States’ fears of the Soviet weapons being
located in Cuba with Soviet fears of the United States engaging in military combat
with Cuba, Thant urged the Soviets to dismantle their missiles immediately in return
for an American guarantee not to invade Cuba. Since Thant advocated this idea
publicly—utilizing the benefits of public decisions mentioned above—it became
the basis for the final agreement days later. Furthermore, to quell Soviet concerns
regarding U.S. missiles in Turkey, Thant encouraged JFK to make a secret
commitment to Khrushchev to remove said missiles.72 Acting as the facilitative
mediator during the Cuban Missile Crisis, Thant was able to “quickly grasp
the . . . issues, . . . respond to the dynamic of the situation, [and] help the parties
realistically evaluate his proposals to determine whether they address[ed] the parties’
underlying interests.”73 By engaging in the mediation sessions, the two global
superpowers of the time were able to retain their perceived positions of power.
Conversely, reaching a deal outside of mediation may have appeared as a
superpower’s concession and thus submission of power—an outcome desired by
neither the United States nor the Soviet Union.
CONCLUSION
Through my analysis of the first thirteen days of the Cuban Missile Crisis, it is
evident that prior to negotiating, the best action a party can take is adequate,
thorough and strategic preparation. Analyzing the potential ZOPA, WATNA, and
BATNA while remaining cognizant that certain factors may not yet be evident,
creates a solid foundation for future negotiations. Although framing a position,
adhering to relevant authority, and creating and maintaining a reputation during
negotiations could help move negotiations forward, resorting to the authority of a
mediator should always remain an option—especially, in complex matters with
sophisticated, strong parties. Even though the Cuban Missile Crisis was not fully
resolved within these thirteen days, by engaging in further mediations, the United

69. Leonard L. Riskin, Mediator Orientations, Strategies and Techniques, 12 ALTERNATIVES 111,
111–13 (1994).
70. Id.
71. A. Walter Dorn & Robert Pauk, Unsung Mediator: U Thant and the Cuban Missile Crisis, 33
DIPLOMATIC HIST. 261, 262 (2009).
72. See generally id.
73. MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., supra note 8, at 546.
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States was able to avoid potential global catastrophe. JFK himself, regarding the
mediation sessions, stated: “U Thant has put the world deeply in his debt.”

